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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009) and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j)
(2009) confers jurisdiction on this Court.
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-802 ("Duty of loyalty")

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Phillip, as trustee, divided the assets of his parents' Trust between himself and
Robert Milner, one of his two brothers, but decided not to distribute any Trust assets to
his third brother, Tracy. All three brothers were equal beneficiaries of the Trust.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 1 3 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075).
Phillip's decision to deny Tracy a Trust distribution was based on Phillip's interpretation
of a document from Tracy purporting to waive and assign to Phillip Tracy's interest in
the Trust and Phillip's interpretation of statements in two letters written by Tracy.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6134, 8-9 Hf 8-11 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 10661075)
Tracy contends that Phillip unreasonably relied on the waiver document because it
failed to satisfy the disclaimer statute, because statements in Tracy's two letters confirm
that Tracy did not intend to waive his Trust interest, because the Trust Agreement
prohibited any assignment of a Trust interest, and because Phillip's conclusion to exclude
Tracy was self-serving and fails to protect the Tracy's interest as a beneficiary.

1

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION BELOW

Tracy Southwick filed his complaint on January 4, 2006. (R. 1-26.) A two-day
bench trial was conducted before district court Judge Ben H. Hadfield on June 16-17,
2009. (R. 1004-1009.) Following the bench trial, Judge Hadfield concluded that Tracy
Southwick was an equal beneficiary of the Trust (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 2 , f 3 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075); that Phillip Southwick had not breached his
fiduciary duty to Tracy Southwick (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9, ^f 12
(Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075); and, that even though Tracy Southwick was a beneficiary,
he was equitably estopped from receiving a portion of a year 2005 Trust distribution
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9,1f 14 (Oct. 9, 2009)(R. 1066-1075). Tracy
Southwick filed his Notice of Appeal of the Court's Order and Judgment. (R. 10821083.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In September 1989, Don B. Southwick and Barbara P. Southwick executed a Trust
Agreement (the "Trust Agreement") forming the Don B. Southwick and Barbara P.
Southwick Irrevocable Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 Tf 1 (Oct. 9,
2009)(R. 1066-1075))(R. 17-24, 1008; Plaintiffs' Trial Ex. 1.)
Phillip served as Trustee of the Trust since its inception. (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 2 ^ 5.) Phillip and his brothers Tracy and Robert Milner are the
three beneficiaries of the Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 f 3.)(R.
1067.); (Order and Judgment at 2 f 5)(R. 1025).
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On or about January 31, 1992, Tracy signed a document purporting to disclaim his
interest in the Trust, and purporting to transfer his interest to Phillip (the "Waiver and
Assignment"). (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3 f 15)(R.
1068)(Defendant's Trial Ex. 6.) The Trust Agreement prohibits any beneficiary from
transferring or assigning their interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 2 H 3.)(R. 1067.); (Trust Agreement Art. 5: "Spendthrift Provision") (R. 22.)
Barbara Southwick told Phillip that she wanted the Trust assets to be distributed
only to Phillip and Robert Milner.l (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5 U
26.)(R. 1070.)
Tracy testified that in the summer of 2001 he spoke to Phillip to inquire about his
(Tracy's) interest in the Trust and Phillip told Tracy that Tracy no longer had an interest
in the Trust because of the Waiver and Assignment, but Tracy refuted signing the Waiver
and Assignment. (R. 1091) (Tr. 72:4-13, 25-73:25); (R. 1091)(Tr. p. 205: 15-19.)
On February 24, 2002, Barbara Southwick died, at which time the Trust directed
that the Trust assets be distributed equally between Phillip, Robert and Tracy. (Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 If 1, 3; 5 1f 29.)(R. 1067, 1070.) (Plaintiffs' Trial Ex.
1.)
After Barbara Southwick's death and funeral in 2002, Tracy wrote Phillip a letter
dated April 7, 2002, (and Tracy wrote a similar letter to Robert Milner, dated April 20,
1

Barbara Southwick was Tracy Southwick's step-mother, and she received her
husband's, Don Southwick's, interest in the Trust and became its sole beneficiary (with
Phillip, Tracy and Robert as contingent beneficiaries) pursuant to a divorce decree.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 ^ 8.)(R. 1067.)
3

2002) wherein Tracy stated that Tracy did not remember whether or not he signed the
Waiver and Assignment, that he was not going to do anything about the Trust, and that
Phillip and Robert could do anything they wanted with the Trust assets. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law at 5-6fflf30-31.)(see Addendum B) (R. 1070-71.) (Def. Trial
Exs. 7-8).
In his letters, Tracy also stated:
To Phillip: "I have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody
else, for that matter, would intentionally and knowingly sign away their
inheritance? No. And neither would you." Id.
To Robert: "Do you think I would intentionally sign away my inheritance? Would
you? I don't know of anybody that would." Id.
Phillip testified that when he received Tracy's April 2002 letter that he had
previously spoken with Tracy and Tracy confirmed his belief that he (Tracy) was still a
beneficiary of the Trust. (R. 1091)(Tr.p. 205: 15-19.) Phillip also testified that he never
spoke with Tracy about Tracy's statements in Tracy's April 2002 letter. (R. 1091) (Tr. p.
207.)
Phillip considered the Waiver and Assignment and Tracy's April 2002 letters as
confirmation of Tracy's intent to disclaim his interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 8 If 8) (R. 1073); (R. 1091) (Tr. p. 254.)

4
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On or about March 9, 2005, Phillip sold the Trust's property in Lehi, Utah for
$300,000 and divided the proceeds equally between himself (Phillip) and Robert Milner.
(PI. Tr. Ex. 15) (R. 1008); (R. 1091)(Tr. at p. 171-172).
Tracy received no distribution from the sale of the Lehi, Utah property. Id.
The trial court concluded that Phillip's reliance on Tracy's statements would
operate to Phillip's detriment if Tracy was allowed to assert that he did not renounce his
interest in the Trust or that he did not renounce his claim to an interest in the Trust assets.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 ^f 11.) (R. 1074.)
The trial court concluded that Tracy was estopped from asserting that prior to
filing the Complaint that he did not renounce his interest in the Trust. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law at 9114.) (R. 1074.); (Order and Judgment at 211-3)(R. 1025).
The trial court concluded that the Waiver and Assignment did not comply with the
applicable disclaimer statute in force in 1992, Utah Code § 75-2-802 (1991). (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law at 9 f 15.) (R. 191, 1074.) (see Utah Code § 75-2-802
(1991) attached as Addendum C.)
The trial court concluded that Tracy is entitled as a beneficiary of the Trust to
receive his one-third share of the remaining assets in the Trust. (Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 9 f 16.) (R. 1074.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Phillip breached his duty of loyalty when he interpreted the Waiver and
Assignment and Tracy's statements in Tracy's two April 2002 letters in a way that
5

benefited himself (Phillip) and not Tracy, by concluding that Tracy desired to waive or
disclaim his (Tracy's) interest in the trust, and by dividing the Trust assets (including
Tracy's share) between himself (Phillip) and his other brother, Robert.
Appellants' position is that it was unreasonable and a breach of Phillip's fiduciary
duty to disregard Tracy's interest in the Trust by relying on a legally ineffective Waiver
and Assignment and to rely on statements in Tracy's two letters, and where Phillip was
relying on his mother's (Barbara's) desire that Tracy receive no assets from the Trust,
and where Tracy confirmed on the phone and in his two letters that he would "not sign
away his inheritance," and where Phillip made no effort to contact Tracy after receiving
the letters to determine Tracy's intent, prior to Phillip's dividing the proceeds from the
sale of Trust assets between himself (Phillip) and his brother, Robert Milner.
Lack of Detrimental Reliance
Appellants' contend that Tracy Southwick should not be estopped from receiving
his share of the prior Trust distribution because Phillip would not be injured if he were
ordered to return Tracy's share of the Trust distribution to Tracy because Phillip was
never entitled to Tracy share of the Trust assets, and there is no evidence supporting the
trial court's conclusion of detrimental reliance by Phillip.
The trial court's August 18, 2009, Order and Judgment should be vacated, and
Appellants should be entitled to receive Tracy's equal share of the Trust distribution.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT TRACY'S
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE TRUST WAS NOT
TERMINATED.
A.

The Disclaimer did not Substantially Comply with Utah's Disclaimer
Statute.

Phillip acknowledges that the Disclaimer document at issue does not satisfy the
four part test outlined in the Utah Disclaimer Statute. See Appellee's Brief at 16-17.
Instead, Phillip argues that Tracy "substantially" complied with the statute; but Phillip's
position was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court, which concluded that validity of a
disclaimer depends on whether the disclaimer strictly complies with the Utah Disclaimer
Statute enforceable at the time the disclaimer was executed. See Whitney v. Faulkner,
2004 UT 52, P14; 95 P.3d 270 ("one who wishes to take advantage of the [disclaimer]
statute's provisions ... must comply with its terms."). The Utah Supreme Court stated
that "substantial complain[ce]" with this disclaimer statute, rather than strict compliance,
"simply ignores both the language of the statute and of the document..." Whitney. 2004
UT 52, P14 (referring to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801 (Supp. 2003). The Court further
stated that the "plain language" of provisions (l)(b)(l) and (l)(b)(2) "requires that a
disclaimer 'describe the property or interest disclaimed' and 'declare the disclaimer and
extent thereof." Whitney v. Faulkner. 2004 UT 52, f 13, 95 P.3d 270. Thus, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the phrase "describe" and "declare" required a definite
statement. Likewise, Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-802(l)(b)(iv)(1991) requires a definite
statement that the document "is proper under Subsection (4)..." Phillip should not be
7

allowed to rests on "substantial" compliance and thereby subvert his fiduciary duties to
Tracy as a trust beneficiary, for Phillip's personal benefit.
B.

Tracy did not Waive his Beneficial Interest

Phillip incorrectly argues the Utah Disclaimer Statute by citing to its language
limiting its application to testamentary dispositions. Phillip argues that the statute opens
the door to alternative means of disclaiming testamentary transfers; this would render the
statute meaningless. See Appellee's Brief at 19-20. The Utah Disclaimer Statute deals
specifically with testamentary dispositions and the introductory language cited by Phillip
applies to transfers and dispositions other than those described under this statute.
Furthermore, Phillip cannot refer to Tracy's letters as a waiver of his beneficial interest
because the letters have language that contradict Phillip's claim that Tracy intended to
relinquish his interest:
To Phillip: "I have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody
else, for that matter, would intentionally and knowingly sign away their
inheritance? No. And neither would you." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 5-6fflf30-31.)(see Appellee's Brief Addendum E-F) (R. 1070-71.) (Def.
Trial Exs. 7-8).
To Robert: "Do you think I would intentionally sign away my inheritance? Would
you? I don't know of anybody that would." Id.

8
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C.

Tracy Did Not Consent to Modifying the Irrevocable Trust

The Disclaimer document makes no reference to any modification or amendment
of the irrevocable trust at issue. Phillip argues that somehow Tracy's signature on the
Disclaimer also worked as an acknowledgement to Don's and Barbara's joint
modification to their trust pursuant to their divorce. See Appellee's Brief at 21-22.
However, because Tracy did not agree to any such trust modification, and the Disclaimer
document is not a consent to any modification, the trust amendment does not affect
Tracy's interest. Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977) (a trust may be
modified only "where all the beneficiaries thereof consent"); see also Nolan v.
Hoopiiana, 2006 UT 53, f 30, 144 P.3d 1129 (stating that at trust may be revoked "only if
and to the extent such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the trust" (internal
quotation omitted)). Restrictions on amending trusts are further explained in Banks v.
Means:
It is well settled that "[a] trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to
property is vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for
the benefit of the beneficiaries." . . . "Once the settlor has created the trust he is no
longer the owner of the trust property and has only such ability to deal with it as is
expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." . . . Thus, a settlor has the
power to modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that such power is
explicitly reserved by the terms of the t r u s t . . . Furthermore, "the creation of a
trust involves the transfer of property interests in the trust subject-matter to the
beneficiaries. These interests cannot be taken from [the beneficiaries] except in
accordance with a provision of the trust instrument." 2002 UT 65,19, 52 P.3d
1190 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
This principle was reaffirmed in 2003 in In re Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589, where the
Court stated "a settlor has the power to modify a trust only if and to the extent that such a
power was reserved by the terms of the trust." Here, the Trust is irrevocable and
9

unamendable. See Appellee's Addendum A: Trust Agreement, Art. II. The Utah
Supreme Court stated further that "[t]he transfer of property interests to the beneficiaries
'cannot be taken from them except in accordance with a provision of the trust instrument
. . . . ' " Id. 1HI12, 13, quoting George G. Bogert & George T Bogert, Trusts & Trustees §
998 (2d ed. rev. 1983). See Kline v. Department of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (a trustor has the power to modify a trust only if and to the extent that such a
power was reserved by the terms of the trust, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 331
(1959)).
Without consent by Tracy, Don and Barbara's amendment to the Trust could not
adversely affect Tracy's beneficial interest. See In re Flake, supra. Without any
evidence of Tracy's alleged consent to the Trust amendment, Tracy remains a beneficiary
in the Trust and is entitled to his beneficial interest in the Trust's assets.
1.

Language of the Trust Amendment Does Not Affect Tracy.

Even if Tracy's consent was not required, the Trust amendment had no effect on
Tracy's interest. While the Divorce Decree opened the door to the amendment,
ultimately, the joint modification language fell short of affecting Tracy's interest.
Specifically, Don and Barbara agreed to:
"remove Don B. Southwick as a beneficiary under the terms of that
Trust Agreement and to designate Barbara P. Southwick as the sole
beneficiary under the terms of the Trust Agreement." See
Appellee's Addendum C: Trust Amendment Letter Agreement.
This "amendment" does not adversely affect any beneficiary other than Don, and merely
transfers Don's interest to Barbara. No mention is made of affecting any other interests
10
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in the Trust. No revocation, altering, shifting, modifying or amending of Phillip's,
Robert's or Tracy's contingent interests is mentioned. Tracy remains a beneficiary in the
Trust and is entitled to his beneficial interest in the Trust's assets.
II.

PHILLIP BREACHED HIS DUTY OF LOYALTY BY BENEFITING
HIMSELF AT HIS BROTHER'S EXPENSE.
Phillip argues that he did not breach hisfiduciaryduty because he "acted

reasonably" as the Trustee. See Appellee's Brief at 34. Phillip acknowledges that after
he received the Disclaimer, Tracy "assert[ed] his interest or claim to the Trust." See
Appellee's Brief at 30. Knowing Tracy claimed an interest in the Trust, Phillip points to
Tracy's letters as confirmation that Tracy walked away from his interest in the Trust. Id.
But, Phillip makes no reference to the statements in Tracy's letters where Tracy writes:
"I have one question for you, brother. Do you think that I, or anybody else, for that
matter, would intentionally and knowingly sign away their inheritance? No. And neither
would you." (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 5-6fflf30-31.)(see Appellee's
Addendum E-F) (R. 1070-71.) (Def. Trial Exs. 7-8).
Phillip is claiming that it was reasonable for him to rely on the letters but they
include the statements that Tracy would not walk away or sign away his interest in the
Trust (his "inheritance"). If the Court approved Phillip's decision it would open the door
to trustees making self-serving judgment calls on anything that could benefit them which
disregards the trustee's duty to protect the beneficiary, and place the beneficiary's interest
before the trustee's. Wheeler v. Mann, 763 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1988) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 170, at 312 (4th ed. 1987)) (the trustee must
11
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"administer the trust 'solely in the interest of the beneficiary,'" and may not "place
himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to its
beneficiaries").
III.

RETURNING TRACY'S SHARE OF THE TRUST IS NOT A
DETRIMENT.
It is not a detriment to Phillip to require him to return money that he was not

entitled to receive. Phillip's only example of a detriment is being required to return Trust
funds and paying them to Tracy, and being personally liable to do so. See Appellee's
Brief at 29-33. Yet, Phillip points to no law where disgorging a portion of a distribution
improperly made by a trustee to himself is a detriment—and Tracy has found none.
Phillip also claims that he would suffer a detriment if the sale price of the Lehi property
is subject to question (Appellee's Brief at 30), but Phillip presented evidence at trial that
the sale price: $300,000, was the actual value of the property sold. (R. 1091)(Tr. p. 220222.).
Tracy's appeal of this issue is not a challenge to the trial court's findings of fact,
but is only an appeal of its conclusion of law that Tracy is precluded from sharing in the
Trust's single distribution because of estoppel, which requires that the Court conclude
that Phillip would suffer a detriment if he had to return Tracy's share of the Trust
distribution.
IV.

THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT AFFECT TRACY'S BENEFICIAL
INTEREST.
Phillip proposes the alternative theory that the Court's judgment may be affirmed

by looking to the Divorce Decree of the settlors, and confirming that Phillip properly
12
SLC 664350.1

relied on this Decree in acting as Trustee. This theory fails for multiple reasons of both
fact and law.
A.

The Divorce Decree Did Not Amend the Trust

The language of the Divorce Decree reads out of "both sides of its mouth." The
Decree states that the parties shall give written notice to the Trustee to do whatever is
necessary to make "[Barbara] the sole beneficiary of the assets of the Trust as her sole
and separate property" but also states that "[Barbara] shall be the recipient and the sole
beneficiary under the Trust Agreement." See Appellee's Addendum C: Divorce Decree,
p. 3. Interestingly, the Decree does nothing more than direct the divorcing parties—Don
and Barbara—to work together to amend the Trust. Nowhere does the Decree itself
purport to amend the Trust. Alternatively, if the Decree directs the Trustee to amend the
Trust, the result is the same, the Decree does not amend the Trust, but instead gives
conflicting instructions to the Trustee. Regardless, whether the Decree directs Don and
Barbara or the Trustee, it does not amend the Trust or affect Tracy's beneficial interest.
B.

The Divorce Decree Could Not Amend the Trust

Utah Supreme Court Justice Dallin H. Oaks, writing for the majority, said it best,
that a district court has no authority, in a divorce proceeding, "to alter property rights
already vested in other parties, such as in the children who are the beneficiaries of [a]
trust." Sundquistv. Sundquist 639 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1981). Justice Oaks further
clarified that the district court only has power "to reallocate property rights between the
parties to the divorce." Id. This opinion grew from a case that held a district court's
decree cannot incorporate the parents' stipulation to terminate a child's right to child
13

support. Hill v. Hill 638 P.2d 516 (Utah 1981) (A child's interest in property cannot be
"bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in any way defeated by the agreement or
conduct of the parents."). Here, neither Don nor Barbara could have 'bartered away'
Tracy's right to his beneficial interest in the Trust. And, even if it was their intent—
which it was not—the Court's decree could not have incorporated or imposed this
agreement.
Justice Oaks added, citing Clayton v. Behle, 565 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977), that a
trust amendment (in Clayton a termination) requires that "[a]ll beneficiaries must
consent." Sundquist 639 P.2d at 187. In Sundquist, trust termination was prevented
where two "children of the parties" did not object to the proposed trust termination but
failed to provide their consent, and without this "affirmative" consent the trust could not
be altered (terminated) and the childrens' interests could not be extinguished. Id.
Similarly, here, without Tracy's consent neither the Court nor the parents could
extinguish his interest in the irrevocable Trust.
C.

The Divorce Decree Could Not Have Terminated Tracy's
Interest Without His Consent.

Even if the language of the Decree is seen as amending the irrevocable Trust, the
Court did not have the authority to impact Tracy's interest without Tracy's consent (and
there is no evidence of such consent). Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-411(5) (a court may
modify an irrevocable trust without the consent of the beneficiary only if the court
determines that the interests of the nonconsenting beneficiary will be adequately
protected). Admittedly, this section of Utah's code, enacted in 2004, post-dates the
14
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Decree; however, this statute was undoubtedly born from earlier principles and policies
on this issue in Utah and throughout the country. Beilev v. Beilev, 398 So. 2d 932 (Fla.
Ct. App. 1981) (citing six additional jurisdictions for guidance).
In Beiley, a divorce decree was entered which ordered an amendment of an
irrevocable trust. Beilev, 398 So. 2d 932. The issue on appeal was whether or not the
court could order, via divorce decree, an amendment to an irrevocable trust without the
consent of a beneficiary. Id. Ultimately, the court held that an amendment to an
irrevocable trust without the consent of a beneficiary (there, a son), could occur where the
son's interest was not impaired by the amendment. Id. at 934 ("Although Florida cases
have not previously addressed this issue, we now hold that an irrevocable trust may be
amended without the consent of the beneficiary when the settlor surrenders privileges or
rights in favor of the beneficiary.")(emphasis supplied).
Here, the divorce court dealt with a division of property between spouses—Don
and Barbara—pursuant to a divorce. When an agreement was reached between the
parties, including a transfer of Don's interest in the Trust to Barbara, the Court entered
the Decree confirming their agreement and directing this Trust amendment be
accomplished. Accordingly, the Decree did not affect Tracy's beneficial interest in the
Trust. Even if the Decree did affect Tracy's interest, there is no evidence that Tracy
consented to this proposed property division, to the transfer of Don's interest in the Trust,
or to the alleged termination of Tracy's interest and therefore any amendment caused by
the Decree terminating Tracy's interest without his consent would be improper.

15

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Appellants and Cross-Appellees respectfully request an
order vacating and reversing the trial court's August 18, 2009, Order and Judgment and
finding that Phillip Southwick breached his fiduciary duty to Tracy Southwick and that
Tracy Southwick can assert his claim for his equal share of the Trust assets prior to the
date the Complaint was filed; denying Appellee's Cross Appeal; and remanding for a
determination of damages for Tracy Southwick in an amount equal to Tracy Southwick's
share of the Trust distributions prior tofilingthe Complaint; and such additional relief as
the court deems appropriate.
DATED: August 23, 2010.

latthew G^orimmer
ErinT. Middleton
Durham Jones & Pinegar
torneys for Appellants
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